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The Diplomat
3 hours ago
- Business
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Washington Discusses the Future of Central Asia-US Relations, While Beijing Takes Concrete Action
The Atlantic Council, a Washington, D.C.-based think tank, held its inaugural U.S.-Central Asia Forum on June 5 to discuss the future of Washington's strategy toward the region. The discussion, organized by the Atlantic Council's Eurasia Center, comes at an opportune time as Central Asia engages extraregional states to cement relationships and attract new partners and investors. In the past two months, several high-profile meetings have taken place, including the first Central Asia-European Union summit, the first Central Asia-Italy summit (which took place during Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Miloni's visit to Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan), and an informal summit of heads of states of the Organization of Turkic States. Moreover, the second China-Central Asia summit occurred in mid-June. Meanwhile, Washington has lagged behind regarding high-profile engagement with Central Asia in the first months of the second Trump administration. Speakers at the event included Kazakhstan's Ambassador to the U.S. Yerzhan Ashikbayev; Alisher Akhmedov, the deputy chief of mission of Uzbekistan in Washington; and former officials like Lisa Curtis, currently a senior fellow and director of the Indo-Pacific Security Program at the Center for a New American Security (CNAS), and former U.S. Ambassador to Kyrgyzstan (2008 to 2011) Tatiana Gfoeller. Mining was a significant topic for the conference. Ashikbayev, for example, highlighted that Kazakhstan produces '20 critical minerals;' regarding uranium, 'we have a gargantuan share of the global production, 40 percent.' Investment in infrastructure remains a priority for the country, which would help with the transportation of critical minerals to international markets, like the U.S. and Europe. Current projects include expanding Kazakhstan's railroad system 'We are planning to construct 5,000 kilometers of railroads [by] 2030,' the ambassador said. Moreover, Astana plans to expand the size of its Caspian fleet 'from 17 to 34 [transport] vessels.' The Caspian Sea is a critical artery of the Middle Corridor, connecting Kazakhstan's Aktau and Kuryk ports with Azerbaijan's Baku port, hence additional vessels and tankers are mandatory to increase the volume of transportation. Meanwhile, Akhmedov highlighted an April visit to the U.S. capital by an Uzbek government delegation led by Foreign Affairs Minister Bakhtiyor Saidov, which included meetings with Secretary of State Marco Rubio. A memorandum on critical minerals was reportedly signed during Saidov's visit. 'We are now moving forward' via this document, Akhemdov said at the forum, as the 'critical mineral focus is a strategic realignment' of bilateral relations. Figuring out how to capitalize on the second Trump administration's focus on critical minerals and energy-related supply chains in general to attract U.S. interest and engagement with the Central Asian countries is the primary challenge for Astana and Tashkent. Ashikbayev highlighted Astana's membership in the Mineral Security Partnership, the country being a 'strong supporter and participant in the critical minerals dialogue,' and noted how Kazakhstan is the 'driver' of the C5+1 format. Similarly, Akhmedov noted that Uzbekistan aims to use the country's mineral resources not only for extraction and mining-related profit but also to 'become a trusted and highly valued partner in global supply chains.' It is worth noting that, during the recent China-Central Asia summit, the presidents of China, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan discussed expanded cooperation on natural gas and minerals, and the construction of the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway. Central Asian countries are engaging with Beijing on critical topics like energy and minerals, and pursuing concrete projects in these areas, while Washington remains stuck in conversation. The forum attempted to game out how Washington, once again under Donald Trump's leadership, will engage Central Asia. Curtis, a former National Security Council senior director for South and Central Asia (2017-2021), explained that the new Trump administration is still in its early days, and 'we haven't heard about Central Asia' in the U.S. capital yet. She argued that 'the China angle will dictate' U.S. engagement in Central Asia, with a focus on 'mostly economic but also political, and maybe security' issues. Gfoeller was more pessimistic, hypothesizing that Washington won't fully engage Central Asia 'unless President Trump sees that there is a specific reason to engage with a particular country.' The terms 'transactional' and 'realistic' were used often to describe how Washington may engage Central Asia for the next four years. For comparison's sake, Xi talked about 'mutual respect, mutual trust and mutual benefit' at the recent summit in Astana. The Biden administration maintained momentum in Central Asia-U.S. engagement with highlights including a historic presidential 5+1 meeting in 2023, a business-oriented B5+1 in Almaty and the launch of the C5+1 Critical Minerals Dialogue in 2024. (I have proposed a Green 5+1 to promote engagement on environmental issues.) During his confirmation hearing, Rubio noted the need to repeal the Jackson Vanik amendment – a topic mentioned by Ashikbayev at the forum – however, that requires Congressional legislation and previous efforts have stalled in committee. In spite of this promising statement, we have yet to see the formulation of a strategy or even direct interest in Central Asia on the part of the administration. Another topic discussed were potential trips by senior U.S. officials to Central Asia. Miras Zhiyenbayev, advisor to the chairman of the board for international affairs and initiatives at Kazakhstan's Maqsut Narikbayev University, noted that 'high-level visits are political acts that demonstrate a country's willingness to work with the region and engage with the region.' As noted above, in recent weeks, there were several high-level visits and meetings by European officials and China's president to Central Asia. A visit by Rubio to Astana for a ministerial 5+1 would help jumpstart the new administration's momentum in the region, but so far no such meeting has been announced. Overall, the speakers at the forum agreed on the importance of increased U.S. engagement with Central Asia. 'The United States has a great opportunity to engage more in Central Asia. The Central Asians want the U.S. there,' Curtis argued. Gfoeller said, 'I recently met with a high-level Central Asian official who told me that he welcomed what he thought would be a more transactional approach from the Trump administration. She added that the official 'said that during the Biden administration, we were lectured to about climate change, about human rights, and it was just lecturing and never was anything concrete done to benefit our country.' Former U.S. ambassador to Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan Daniel Rosenblum, moderating the panel, pushed back on that assessment, illustrating a diversity of perspectives on the tone and perception of U.S. engagement. Respecting the will and well-being of the people of Central Asia was a topic that the Atlantic Council's forum did not discuss in great detail. Navbahor Imamova, a longtime journalist with Voice of America, said on social media that the region's 'nontransparent and nepotistic regimes, marked by a lack of rule of law and media freedom,' should have been addressed. That label certainly applies to authoritarian Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and increasingly Kyrgyzstan. Finally, it is vital to acknowledge that the five Central Asian states differ regarding their foreign policy objectives, engagement styles, and domestic governance. Indeed, of the five states, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan are clearly very interested in increasing engagement and cooperation with Washington, and have the capacity to do so. Two days before the forum, Kazakhstan's Ashikbayev spoke at the Future Resilience Forum about Kazakhstan as a middle power, an event also held in the U.S. capital. 'The more partnerships we have, the better it will be for our own development,' the Kazakhstani diplomat summarized at the Atlantic Council event. Similarly, Uzbekistan routinely sends delegations to Washington. However, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan's footprint in Washington is much more limited, with Turkmenistan's engagement in the U.S. capital almost non-existent. A lack of a strategy with short-, medium- and long-term goals and projects toward Central Asia continues to be Washington's loss, and Beijing's gain.
The Diplomat
6 hours ago
- Politics
- The Diplomat
India's Monarchy Fantasy in Nepal Is a Strategic Mirage
The vision of a pro-India monarch is a dangerous misreading of Nepal's history, its political complexities, and the implications for India's regional interests. In recent months, pro-monarchy demonstrations have flared across Nepal, with some protesters carrying posters of Indian Chief Minister Yogi Adityanath. These symbolic gestures are not incidental. They signal a growing ideological intersection between Nepal's royalist nostalgia and India's rising Hindu nationalism. For some in India's ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) – and its ideological mentor, the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) – the return of a Hindu monarchy in Nepal is being framed as both a civilizational triumph and a strategic necessity. But this vision is a dangerous misreading of Nepal's history, its political complexities, and the implications for India's regional interests. For India, the idea of a culturally aligned, Hindu-majority monarchy in Nepal appears attractive amid the growing Chinese presence in the region. Proponents argue that a Hindu king could serve as a bulwark against Beijing, foster cultural affinity, and stabilize a politically turbulent neighbor. This narrative has gained traction among Indian right-wing commentators and politicians alike, echoing similar ideological currents across the subcontinent. But this fantasy is historically flawed and strategically shortsighted. Nepal's monarchy was never the steadfast Indian ally it is now nostalgically remembered as. After King Tribhuvan's exile and return with Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru's support in 1950, hopes for a constitutional monarchy in Nepal were high. Yet these hopes were quickly dashed. King Mahendra's 1960 royal coup dismantled the nascent democracy, suppressed pro-India politicians, and aligned Nepal closer to China – a pattern that recurred with his son, King Gyanendra, during his 2005-08 power grab. Rather than strengthening ties with India, these monarchs often positioned themselves in opposition to Indian influence, using Hindu nationalism to consolidate internal power and assert sovereignty. Gyanendra's regime, in particular, alienated New Delhi and created fertile ground for Chinese strategic inroads. Far from a stabilizing force, Nepal's monarchy repeatedly proved to be a source of autocracy and diplomatic estrangement. The renewed royalist fervor in Nepal is often conflated with calls to re-establish a Hindu state. But not all supporters of a Hindu identity in Nepal support restoring the monarchy. The Nepali Congress, one of the country's largest democratic parties, has formally endorsed the idea of a Hindu state, while opposing monarchical rule. This distinction is crucial. While monarchy implies authoritarian rule, calls for a Hindu state are more about cultural assertion – especially amid growing anxieties over federalism, secularism, and demographic change. Still, both narratives stem from widespread public frustration with Nepal's current political system. Since the monarchy's abolition in 2008, no elected government has completed a full term. Federalism, while progressive in theory, is seen by many Nepalis as creating more inefficiency and corruption, summed up in the popular quip: 'Earlier we had one king, now we have 761.' This disillusionment is the fertile ground on which royalist and theocratic fantasies grow. The BJP-RSS establishment's embrace of Nepal's monarchists reflects more than strategic calculation; it is rooted in a shared ideological affinity for majoritarian nationalism and centralized religious authority. Figures like Yogi Adityanath – who symbolize the fusion of Hindu religiosity and political power – are seen by Nepal's royalist right as aspirational models. The imagery of Adityanath at Nepal's protests is a visual manifestation of this ideological export. Yet India's historical actions have not always helped its image in Nepal. Two unofficial blockades – one in 1989 and another in 2015 – inflicted economic hardship and deepened resentment. Meanwhile, perceptions of Indian interference in Nepal's domestic politics remain strong, further complicated by conspiracy theories (such as India's alleged role in the 2001 royal massacre) that, while baseless, are emotionally potent. These legacies have allowed China to position itself as a 'non-interfering partner' and expand its footprint through infrastructure investments, soft power, and engagement with Nepal's security apparatus. In contrast, India's growing ideological alignment with monarchy risks alienating democratic forces within Nepal and undermining its long-term influence. Restoring a monarchy in Nepal won't fix the structural issues that fuel instability: youth unemployment, rural poverty, and elite-driven governance. Over 4 million Nepalis now work abroad, and remittances equate to nearly 30 percent of GDP. Nepal's economy remains heavily dependent on India, especially for trade, electricity, and transit infrastructure. India has made quiet but substantial investments in this sector – from the 900 MW Arun-III hydropower project to completed railway links like Jaynagar–Bardibas. Cross-border electricity transmission lines and the BBIN (Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Nepal) initiative could position Nepal as a clean energy exporter in the region. These are the kinds of practical integrations that truly stabilize bilateral relations – not ideological posturing. Meanwhile, Nepal's elected communist leaders – despite occasional anti-India rhetoric – have maintained functional ties with New Delhi. Leaders like Pushpa Kamal Dahal and current Prime Minister K.P. Sharma Oli may wave nationalist flags, but their electoral legitimacy requires ongoing engagement with India. Even critics of federalism are not necessarily calling for a return to monarchy, but rather for reforms that make democracy deliver. Ultimately, betting on monarchy is not a foreign policy strategy – it's an ideological fantasy. If India wants to compete with China and maintain long-term influence in Nepal, it must invest in pluralism, economic cooperation, and democratic consolidation. The imagery of Yogi Adityanath in Kathmandu may excite some in Nagpur, but it alarms many in Nepal – and even more in India's diplomatic community. India's strength in South Asia has always come from its democratic model, not its imperial ambitions. Replacing that model with nostalgia for crowns and gods will only open the door further to adversaries who offer infrastructure without interference, and partnership without prescriptions.
The Diplomat
8 hours ago
- Politics
- The Diplomat
Mongolia's Government Transition: Democracy in Action or Foreign Interference?
A recent report alleges that Mongolia's change in government was the product of a Moscow-linked influence operation. Far from it. Mongolia's recent change in government has been widely debated, with some international media outlets speculating about foreign interference. Such claims overlook the deeper democratic processes at play. Far from it, the leadership transition reflects Mongolia's evolving political maturity and the public's demand for transparency and accountability. On June 11, British newspaper The Times published an article alleging that Mongolia's recent change in government was shaped by Kremlin-linked influence and internal power struggles. The article went so far as to frame Prime Minister Oyun-Erdene Luvsannamsrai's resignation as 'an effective coup,' a characterization based solely on unnamed government sources and not corroborated by any other independent outlet. The piece portrayed Mongolia's domestic politics as potentially vulnerable to manipulation by external actors. While this perspective may resonate with broader geopolitical concerns, it overlooks the complex internal dynamics and democratic processes that in fact drove recent developments. A Crisis of Communication and Credibility, Not Foreign Interference The resignation of Oyun-Erdene was not the result of foreign interference. It was the outcome of a lawful democratic process, triggered by sustained public protests over allegations of corruption and government opacity. What began as an organic youth movement, sparked by revelations about the prime minister's son's life of luxury, evolved into a broader call for transparency, integrity, and reform. What ultimately sealed Oyun-Erdene's fate was not external meddling but his failure to engage meaningfully with the public. This misstep is striking, given that in December 2022 he had met face-to-face with thousands protesting corruption in the coal sector. His personal appearance back then defused tensions and earned his government time. When this round of protests began in May 2025, protestors initially made a modest demand: they asked Oyun-Erdene to explain his son's lavish lifestyle, as displayed in social media posts. Yet the prime minister declined to engage, offered no explanation, and appeared to dismiss their concerns. His remarks, referring to protestors as 'flies' and questioning the protests' authenticity, only deepened the disconnect. What began as a call for accountability gradually became a call for resignation. In parliament, Oyun-Erdene argued that his government needed more time to deliver on mega-projects that would, he claimed, raise GDP per capita to $10,000. But after five years, the longest tenure of any prime minister in modern Mongolian history, the public's patience had worn thin. The promise that stability would bring prosperity was no longer convincing; his credibility had eroded. Legislators thus faced a difficult choice: preserve executive stability or respond to an increasingly vocal electorate. The no-confidence vote that followed was not a coup or the product of foreign plots. It was the lawful exercise of democratic checks and balances by elected representatives responding to their constituents. Reuters, the Associated Press, and Al Jazeera all reported the episode as an example of democracy at work, not the result of foreign manipulation. The Danger of Simplistic Narratives Mongolia's geography, landlocked between China and Russia, and its complex foreign policy naturally draw scrutiny. International partners are right to be vigilant about undue foreign influence in any small democracy facing external pressures. But vigilance must not slide into oversimplification. Portraying domestic political developments as mere extensions of great power rivalry diminishes Mongolia's agency and misrepresents its democracy. This is not just a matter of fairness. It is precisely because of Mongolia's foreign policy challenges that such narratives could be so damaging. By portraying Mongolia's democracy as weak and easily manipulated by one of its neighbors, this type of reporting may undermine efforts to strengthen ties not only with China and Russia but also with its so-called third neighbors, including the European Union, Japan, and the United States. If these partners come to see Mongolia as anything less than an independent, sovereign democracy, they will hesitate to deepen engagement. That would be a severe setback at a moment when Mongolia urgently needs investment, cultural exchange, stronger institutions, and deeper diplomatic partnerships. The threat goes well beyond economics. Mongolia's democracy already faces pressures identified by indices such as V-Dem, including diminishing media freedom, reduced judicial independence, and declining public trust. Its health depends on continued support from democratic partners. Emphasizing unverified narratives of foreign manipulation risks weakening Mongolia's international standing, feeding public cynicism, and hampering its ability to build the partnerships essential for protecting its democratic progress. Mongolia's Foreign Minister Battsetseg Batmunkh has publicly challenged the narrative presented in The Times, emphasizing that such portrayals misrepresent the country's political realities and risk undermining its diplomatic credibility. In a recent interview with Arctus Analytics, an Ulaanbaatar-based research and analysis firm, she elaborated on the government's broader concerns about the increasing complexity of Mongolia's international engagement. 'Our foreign relations have expanded rapidly in recent years,' she noted. 'This growth has brought many new actors into the space, including government agencies, local authorities, businesses, and civil society organizations. While this is a welcome sign of international engagement, it also underscores the need for better coordination and oversight, aligned with Mongolia's national interests and security.' Battsetseg revealed that the government is in the process of drafting a comprehensive law to establish clearer guidelines on who may engage in foreign relations on behalf of the state and under what conditions. 'Had such a framework been in place earlier,' she added, 'we might have avoided some of the confusion and misrepresentation that arose from recent international reporting.' Mongolia's Balanced Diplomacy and Expanding Global Partnerships Mongolia's multi-pillared foreign policy is designed to preserve its sovereignty by engaging a wide range of partners and expanding the areas of cooperation. The country maintains strategic partnerships with China and Russia while actively cultivating strong ties with third neighbors such as Japan, the European Union, and other like-minded democracies. What makes this approach effective is not merely the number of partners but also the growing diversity of fields in which Mongolia engages, including mining, infrastructure, energy, education, technology, climate resilience, and cultural exchange. This strategy has delivered tangible results. Japan's support for infrastructure modernization and France's investment in Mongolia's uranium sector demonstrate how Ulaanbaatar has broadened cooperation with trusted partners. Mongolia's uranium partnership with France in particular represents the first major investment from a Western partner since the Oyu Tolgoi agreement and marks a significant milestone in third neighbor cooperation. Mongolia's diplomatic activity also underscores its success in building credibility on the international stage. In 2023 alone, the country hosted or conducted 12 presidential-level visits, six by parliamentary speakers, five by prime ministers, and 23 by foreign ministers, signing 41 intergovernmental documents across diverse sectors. The momentum continued in 2024 with 15 presidential visits, eight prime ministerial meetings, and 19 foreign ministry consultations, reflecting growing international interest in Ulaanbaatar as a credible and neutral interlocutor committed to balanced engagement. At the same time, Mongolia has strengthened its balanced relations with its two neighbors. Recent agreements with China and Russia include a cross-border railway accord to enhance connectivity and a deal to expand and modernize a key power station. These steps show that Mongolia's balanced foreign policy is not merely aspirational; it is being actively implemented. A Call for Thoughtful Engagement Mongolia's recent change in government was not the product of foreign manipulation. It was the outcome of a people holding their leaders accountable through lawful and democratic means. This is not the story of a pawn caught between powerful neighbors. It is the story of a democracy, imperfect yet resilient, determined to chart its own course in a complex region. Oversimplified narratives that portray Mongolia as vulnerable to external manipulation risk undermining the progress the country has made. They damage its standing on the international stage and jeopardize efforts to deepen ties not only with its immediate neighbors but also with trusted partners across the democratic world. Mongolia's diplomacy, marked by new agreements with both neighbors and third neighbor countries, shows that its multi-pillared foreign policy is being implemented in practice, not just in principle. Mongolia deserves thoughtful engagement from international partners who are committed to supporting its sovereignty and its efforts to maintain balance in a challenging geopolitical environment. In an era of rising polarization and competing narratives, responsible journalism and principled diplomacy are not luxuries for small democracies like Mongolia. They are essential safeguards for a nation working to secure its place as a credible, independent, and constructive member of the international community.
The Diplomat
8 hours ago
- Politics
- The Diplomat
Reframing the French Indo-Pacific: French Polynesia, a Model of Shared Sovereignty?
French Polynesia is a pivotal element of France's strategy in the Pacific – and offers a compelling case study for shared sovereignty within the French Republic. As Emmanuel Macron wrapped up his visits to Vietnam, Indonesia, and Singapore – where he delivered the keynote address at the Shangri-La Dialogue at the end of May – the French president reaffirmed the Indo-Pacific's strategic importance for both France and Europe. In a context of growing geopolitical uncertainty and renewed unilateralism, Macron emphasized France's commitment to a stable, multipolar order grounded in international law, freedom of navigation, and inclusive multilateralism – an international posture shared with key partners such as India, Japan, and ASEAN. Building on this common strategic vision, and as the only remaining European Union (EU) member state with sovereign territories in the Indo-Pacific, France seeks to position its diplomacy not only as a national actor but also as a standard-bearer for European engagement in the region. The exercise of sovereignty is precisely what underpins France's specificity and credibility as a resident power. The French Indo-Pacific overseas collectivities (FIPOCs) – La Réunion, Mayotte, les TAAF (or South Antarctic Lands), New Caledonia, Wallis and Futuna, French Polynesia, and Clipperton – which together have a population of 1.65 million inhabitants, play a central role in the construction and elaboration of a credible strategy. Notably, 93 percent of France's Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) lies in the Indian and Pacific Oceans, making it the second largest EEZ in the world after that of the United States. There are also around 200,000 French expats residing in countries of the region, more than 7,000 French subsidiary companies operating in the region, and 8,000 military personnel stationed permanently. The assimilation of the FIPOCs into a single geostrategic Indo-Pacific framework is a logical step for a state seeking to assert itself as a legitimate actor in the region. However, despite some common geographical, economic, and political characteristics, grouping the FIPOCs into a single macro-region does not fully reflect the diversity of contexts and geopolitical challenges specific to each territory. A comprehensive and nuanced understanding of local contexts is thus essential to fully comprehend the complexity of France's Indo-Pacific engagement. This series will explore each of the FIPOCs separately to understand their characteristics, role in France's Indo-Pacific strategy, and potential friction points between national and local drivers. You can view the full series here; today, we focus on French Polynesia. Encompassing five archipelagos and 118 islands, French Polynesia is a pivotal element of France's strategy in the Pacific. Its exclusive economic zone (EEZ), covering nearly 4.8 million square kilometers, accounts for almost half of the total French EEZ – which is the second largest globally. Beyond its maritime significance, French Polynesia offers a compelling case study of how post-colonial legacies, nuclear trauma, and political evolution have shaped a successful model of shared sovereignty within the French Republic. Colonial Imprint and Nuclear Legacy Eastern Polynesia was among the last regions on Earth to be explored and settled by humans. In the case of French Polynesia, archaeological evidence suggests an initial wave of settlement beginning around 800 CE in Tahiti, between 800 and 900 CE in the Marquesas and Gambier Islands, around 1000 CE in the Tuamotu atolls and the eastern parts of the Society Islands, and approximately 1100 CE in the Austral Islands. French influence began formally in 1842 with the establishment of a protectorate, in a context of heated rivalries between French and British colonial power in the region. The territory underwent a major transformation in the 1960s, when France established its Pacific Experimentation Center (CEP), triggering a wave of modernization – and deep trauma. Between 1966 and 1996, France conducted 193 nuclear tests, including 41 atmospheric and 152 underground at Moruroa and Fangataufa (Tuamotu archipelago). These experiments left lasting social and environmental scars. Although long taboo in Paris, the nuclear legacy has since entered public debate. The current political party in power, the pro-independence Tavini Huiraatira, has historically opposed nuclear testing and pushed for transparency and reparations. In 2010, a national law established a right to compensation for individuals recognized as victims of French nuclear testing. In a gesture of appeasement and openness, the French state granted access to the Moruroa site in March 2024 to a high-level Polynesian delegation, including President Moetai Brotherson, marking a shift from opacity to cautious transparency. The change is a rational response considering the evolving political dynamics between Paris and Papeete. Increased Autonomy French Polynesia's political evolution reflects France's gradual accommodation of demands for self-government. From a protectorate (1842–1880) to a colony (1880–1946), and then an overseas territory (1946–2003), the territory has undergone significant institutional transformations. Today, as an overseas collectivity, it enjoys broad autonomy, with its own laws and institutions – including a president, a government, and a parliament – managing key areas such as the budget, foreign investment, and resource exploitation. While sovereign competencies – such as national defense, justice, public order, internal security and currency issuance – remain under the authority of the French state and are implemented by the High Commissioner, foreign affairs may, in certain cases, be the subject of shared competence. A Quiet Model? French Polynesia represents a rare example of international agency of a non-state actor, as it holds formal membership in several interregional organizations, including the Pacific Islands Forum, the Pacific Community, and the Polynesian Leaders Group. Successive presidents of French Polynesia have engaged in high-level meetings with foreign heads of state – a development that underscores the territory's growing diplomatic autonomy. This trend was exemplified by then-President Edouard Fritch's attendance at the first U.S.-Pacific Island Country Summit in 2022, and Brotherson's visit in 2023 to Washington for the second summit, where he met with U.S. President Joe Biden. This ad hoc model of shared competences in foreign affairs can at times create ambiguity. While French Polynesia is at the forefront of France's Indo-Pacific ambitions, local voices – including Brotherson – have expressed skepticism about the wider strategy. But this ad hoc relationship often functions harmoniously, as French presidents have repeatedly associated their counterparts from French Polynesia in the France-Oceania Summits, and even during presidential trips abroad, such as President Macron's visit to Vanuatu in 2023. Despite the enduring legacies of sensitive issues, including the public health consequences of nuclear testing, French Polynesia offers a relatively stable model of negotiated autonomy within the French constitutional order. The most recent example came when Brotherson and French President Emmanuel Macron jointly announced at the U.N. Ocean Conference in Nice that nearly the entire EEZ of the archipelago – 4.55 million sq km, or 47 percent of France's EEZ – would be designated as a Marine Protected Area (MPA), in a mutually beneficial act of environmental diplomacy. Shared sovereignty in French Polynesia diverges from the impasse faced by New Caledonia, suggesting that calibrated devolution and respectful partnership can reconcile historical grievances while maintaining continued political association.
The Diplomat
8 hours ago
- Politics
- The Diplomat
Afghanistan Has a Lot at Stake in the Iran Conflict
From a massive refugee population to a major trade partner, Iran is of crucial importance to the Taliban regime. The U.S. should pay attention to the growing relationship. Mahnoor Naimi recorded her latest vlog on June 22. She asked her viewers to pray for her, and to forgive her, if she didn't make it home. She said she was stuck in Iran. Speaking from the Sang-e Safid camp, near the border between Iran and Afghanistan, the Afghan YouTuber – likely in her mid-20s – appeared weary, but composed. In the video, posted on the same day the United States dropped bombs on Iranian nuclear facilities (and then reposted to her channel a few days later), Naimi said she just wanted to go home to Afghanistan. About a year ago, she left Afghanistan and went to Tehran looking for work. Since then, she has lived in various cities across Iran, trying to build a life. She has shared her journey through videos posted on YouTube. In one of her vlogs, she shared that she worked at a clothing factory, sewing garments. Back in 2021, as the Taliban took control of Afghanistan, reportedly more than a million Afghans fled to Iran for a variety of reasons. But as the war between Israel and Iran heated up, Naimi – and many others – decided it's time to come back. The bombings weren't the only factor. In recent months, Iranian authorities have been rounding up Afghan refugees, transferring them to deportation camps near the Iran-Afghanistan border. Human Rights Watch has described the camps as 'veritable prisons.' Reports of harassment, violence, and even torture at the hands of Iranian officials have continuously emerged from Afghans held in these sites. And that was before the war. Naimi, in her post on June 22, spoke carefully so as not to provoke Iranian audiences. She described the heartbreaking scenes around her: hungry children, frail men and women searching desperately for a piece of bread, and families living in misery. Weeping, she said that more than anything, she wants to return home. 'Whatever Afghanistan is, it is ours. It is our country,' she said in the video. Despite the war unfolding just across its western border, life in Afghanistan remained strikingly calm. One might have expected panic in Kabul, especially given the fragile state of its economy. Yet, remarkably, there has been little visible disruption. Contrary to widespread expectations, the Taliban have refrained from taking a strong public stance on the conflict. The leadership has avoided broad or inflammatory statements – neither issuing loud condemnations of Israel nor showing extraordinary support for Iran. Instead, they have adopted a calculated, restrained posture, one that appears aimed at avoiding entanglement in the broader regional conflict. Since the Taliban's takeover of Afghanistan in August 2021, the group has faced widespread international condemnation and diplomatic isolation. Amid widespread concerns over human rights abuses, particularly against women and minorities, no country has formally recognized the Taliban government. Economic sanctions, the freezing of Afghanistan's central bank assets, and restrictions on foreign aid have further strained the country's fragile economy. That may be why the Taliban appear to be proceeding with caution amid the backdrop of a highly volatile Middle East. The Taliban have previously expressed a desire to normalize relations with the international community, particularly the United States, even if primarily driven by their own interests. That may explain why, during the recent conflict between Israel and Iran, the de facto government demonstrated an unexpected level of restraint. A brief statement issued on June 21 – the day before the U.S. strikes on Iran – outlined a meeting between Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi and Iran's ambassador in Kabul. In the statement, Muttaqi condemned Israel's attacks on Iran, calling them a clear violation of international law, and expressed solidarity with the Iranian people. Yet there have been no mass protests in Afghanistan. No Israeli flags have been burned; no anti-American slogans have been heard. The Taliban's restrained response to the Israel-Iran conflict stands in contrast to the approach taken by some officials during the former U.S.-backed Republic. In 2017, then-Deputy Chief Executive Mohammad Mohaqiq publicly praised and thanked Iranian General Qassem Soleimani – who was later killed in a U.S. airstrike – for his role in forming the Fatemiyoun Brigade, a militia composed of Afghan refugees recruited by Iran to fight in Syria. Mohaqiq's remarks, which also endorsed Iran's efforts to mobilize Afghan fighters, reflected the extent of Tehran's influence even within the leadership of a government established by the United States. The Taliban's current approach toward Iran takes place in a different context. Today, Iran – despite its own constrained circumstances – serves as a pivotal economic lifeline for Afghanistan. The U.N. refugee agency, UNHCR, estimates that nearly 4.5 million Afghan nationals live in Iran, 71 percent of whom are women and children. Other sources suggest the actual number may be even higher. In recent years, Iran has deported thousands of Afghans – a process that only intensified amid the escalating war with Israel. If Iran continues with mass deportations of Afghans, it will exacerbate Afghanistan's existing economic hardships. According to Naimi's vlog, Afghans she met in the camp 'are so vulnerable that it is hard to describe in words.' She noted that the Afghans would urgently need shelter, employment, and food upon arriving in Afghanistan. Yet food and jobs are precisely what Afghanistan cannot offer. The United Nations reported this week that the Afghanistan Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan has received only 18 percent of its required funding as of June 19, severely disrupting aid delivery to millions – including women, children, returnees, refugees, displaced communities, and other vulnerable groups. Reportedly, the Taliban have struggled even to pay their own rank and file. Creating new employment opportunities is hardly expected from an unrecognized regime ruling a landlocked country facing drought and burdened by heavy sanctions. Now, couple the refugee crisis with Afghanistan's heavy reliance on trade with Iran, and the fragility of the country's situation becomes even more apparent. Here, the potential fallout of regional war becomes impossible to ignore. In 2024, both Iranian and Afghan officials highlighted the growing economic ties between the two countries, with some claiming that annual trade had reached billions. According to Afghanistan's TOLO News, official figures from Afghanistan's Ministry of Industry and Commerce indicated that bilateral trade in the first nine months of 2024 totaled $2.2 billion – $2.2 billion in imports and only $38 million in exports. The bulk of Afghan imports from Iran consisted of diesel, petrol, and natural gas. Given the heavy international sanctions on Iran – particularly targeting its oil and gas sector – such exports to Afghanistan provide Tehran with a critical economic outlet and a rare source of foreign currency. Heavily sanctioned itself, Afghanistan has little choice but to rely on Iran's oil and gas – an uneasy dependence that forges ties born out of necessity rather than genuine alliance. After investing two decades of effort and resources, the United States now appears to be allowing Afghanistan to fall into the sphere of Iran, a regional rival and adversary. For now, the Taliban's relatively measured approach to the Iran-Israel conflict reflects their lingering hope to forge some level of ties with Washington. But if Taliban leaders eventually give up those efforts, a full-fledged embrace of Iran could follow. This is not merely about leaving Afghanistan trapped in the misery of sanctions – allowing Iran to gain influence represents a strategic setback for the United States after pouring blood and billions into the country. It raises urgent questions about the true cost of the United States' longest war and the enduring consequences of its withdrawal, if Afghanistan drifts further into the orbit of a heavily sanctioned regional adversary. The rights of millions of Afghan girls and women like Mahnoor Naimi – to work, to receive an education, and to live with dignity in their own country – should never be up for negotiation. Still, the tentative ceasefire with Iran – and the prospect of a weakened regime in Tehran – may offer the United States an opportunity to rethink its approach to Afghanistan and pursue a path of calculated, diplomatic engagement. Absent meaningful engagement, a destabilized Afghanistan – fraught with desperation, isolation, and volatility – risks becoming a nexus of renewed extremism and proxy conflicts that the United States and its allies cannot afford to disregard. This does not imply that the U.S. should endorsed the Taliban, nor empower a regime widely condemned for systemic gender-based oppression. Rather, it reflects a sober recognition of the complex and enduring realities on the ground: to forgo engagement with the de facto authorities is to abandon millions of Afghans like Naimi, who are caught in an intensifying humanitarian and political crisis. Persisting with sanctions in the absence of dialogue threatens only to exacerbate their suffering. Without urgent intervention, the lives of Naimi and millions of Afghan men, women, and children – who remain, by choice or circumstance, unable to flee – hang precariously by a thread.
